War On terror and Pakistan

War On terror and Pakistan


Introduction
Sun that rose on the morning of 12th of sep 2001 saw a totally different world. 9/11 incident has changed this modern world altogether, things have changed their definitions, now everything has a new and diverse meaning in the current perspective. Though these terrorist attacked were carried out in America by some anonymous individuals but it’s the common man of Pakistan and Afghanistan who are paying its price, who is being killed every day in suicide bombing, missile attacks, air strikes etc, who hardly know anything about world towers or Al-Qaida or Bush etc. War On terror once again brought Pakistan and Afghanistan to the lime light and once again Pakistan became the front line state in the war against terrorism and world is listened to the same kind of rhetoric about Pakistan and its importance that they used to hear back in 1980s. Pakistan’s relations with USA once again became of primary importance as USA is leading this war and asking for Pakistan’s co-operation against Taliban and Al Qaida. This war on terror has raised many question for Pakistan and possible answers for these questions are not all that easy to find. These question are mainly concerned with issue like,

· Pakistan’s external Security concerns
· Pakistan’s internal Security concerns
· PAK – USA Relations



Pakistan and the War on Terrorism
After September 11, the Pakistan army knew its strategic overextension in the region, especially its support for the Taliban and, by implication, al-Qaida, was weak. But nearly bankrupt, the country had neither the political will nor the resources to take on these forces. The United States would provide Pakistan with both and, in turn, receive critical support from Pakistan in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in a number of ways, by granting logistics facilities, sharing intelligence, and capturing and handing over al-Qaida terrorists. Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists, and committed more troops than any other nation in the GCTF (Global Counterterrorism Force)." Additionally, Pakistan has sealed off its western border and has made two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace available to the U.S. military.
According to Pakistan Embassy officials in Washington, D.C., Pakistan has deployed more than seventy thousand of its troops to the Afghan border and has launched more than thirty-eight major successful operations to flush out foreign terrorists. More than three hundred Pakistan army and paramilitary troops have been killed, and an even larger number have been injured, accounting for more casualties than any other U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. the intelligence provided by Pakistan has led to successes against terrorism around the world. For example, all of the top al-Qaida leaders captured to date have been apprehended in Pakistan with the government's help, while Pakistan itself has arrested more than seven hundred terror suspects. The country has also banned or placed on watch lists a large number of sectarian and militant organizations and has enacted numerous antiterrorism laws, freezing thirty-two bank accounts suspected of belonging to terrorist organizations. Finally, Pakistan is currently creating a national criminal database and is the first country to successfully install PISCES, a terrorist-interdiction program set up at seven Pakistani airports and at border crossings with India.
For its part, in the three years after September 11, the United States extended grants to Pakistan equaling $1 billion and wrote off $1 billion in debt. In June 2003, the U.S. announced a $3 billion assistance package for Pakistan to start in October 2004 and to be distributed over five years, with roughly equal amounts going to economic aid and security assistance. Additionally, a framework agreement on trade and investment (TIFA) has been signed, and the two countries have begun negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. On the security front, the U.S. approved a $1.2 billion arms-sale package that includes roughly $950 million for the purchase of P3C Orion aircraft. In March 2005, President Bush authorized the sale of a yet-to-be-specified number of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. The United States has also reinstated a military-training program through which some three hundred officers have received instruction at U.S. military institutions since 2001.
The current U.S.-Pakistan engagement may be focused on cooperation in the war on terrorism, especially on building the military-intelligence partnership between the two countries, but it is not limited to it. Pakistan's domestic order, especially its weak institutional architecture, stillborn political process, underdeveloped economy, poor educational system, unsure civil society, and simmering internal tensions, enhances the potential for extremism and instability and has been of serious concern to the United States. Pakistan , too, realizes the dangers and government is trying to lead the country in a new direction.
Pakistan Government recognizes that there is a need for institution building, economic development, improvement in relations between the center and provinces, and bringing an end to extremism and sectarianism. Pakistan government has the support of the United States, not only because broader reforms in Pakistan are central to combating religious extremism and succeeding in the war on terrorism, but also because regional peace and stability are requisite to the realization of America's economic and strategic interests in the region. Nonetheless, both Pakistan and the United States face difficult challenges.
Challenges for Pakistan
This war on terror has put Pakistan into a big fix and is posing many questions, questions related to its internal and external security, growing trends of talibanization, arousing anti-American sentiments etc.
External security Concerns
Pakistan’s geographical position makes it the important ally in this was on terror, but at the same time Pakistan's geopolitical environment remains a threat to its external and internal security and may explain government's wariness to take bold steps, especially in dealing with the jihadists. Relations with India are a case in point. India and Pakistan may have come a long way from their posture of confrontation, but peace between them is still far off. Only time will tell if there has been an enduring change in India's strategic stance toward Pakistan or the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan, therefore, has to watch India's moves carefully.
Taliban :- But biggest challenge for Pakistan and USA at the moment is Taliban, Pakistan took a u-turn in 2001 when they decided to abandon support Taliban and decided to join USA in this war on terror. It was a big change, Pakistan made and developed Taliban for more than 6 ot 7 years , Pakistan was one of the important country who acknowledged Taliban’s government and had diplomatic relations with them, but when Taliban refused to listen to their master over Osama Bin Laden, rift started between the two and widened further ever since. with out Pakistan support it was impossible for Taliban to with stand against mighty USA fire power and it took days to capture Kabul and rest of Afghanistan, But Taliban went back to their traditional war tactics, guerilla warfare, that what they are best at and that how they were trained by the ISI, as things became tough inside Afghanistan, these Taliban element, as most of these gents were grown up in the midrassas across Pakistan, for them Pakistan was like second home, these scores of Taliban who were of diverse nationalities across the Durand line ( border line between Pakistan and Afghanistan ) and found safe heavens in the tribal areas of Pakistan, were they were cordially welcomed by the local mullahs and Islamic extremists who were already mad with anti american sentiment. These factors combined together formed ideal conditions for Taliban to launch guerilla attacks on the foreign forces present in Afghanistan. As these activities picked up frequency, the attention of whole world diverted to the these tribal areas and they became centre of attention. Pakistan army under American pressure launched operation against theses elements in the FATA region, which caused a huge reaction across the targeted area, Pakistan army had some success but suffered huge losses as well and this maniac of terrorism came further in to the settled areas of NWFP province of Pakistan and world saw peaceful area like swat etc burning in this fire of terrorism, where local mullahs together with Taliban prepared a bread of suicide bomber and implanted them across Pakistan, killing thousand of innocent civilian as well as security personals. This has hurt the over all internal and external security of the country greatly. There is great danger that these Taliban element might creep down to the plans of Punjab and sindh and might ruin everything. To fight against this danger successfully and to continue to peruse war on terror’s objective is pakistan’s biggest challenge, which is in fact the question of Pakistan’s future and existence.
Indo Pak Relations :- 9/11 offered a new dimension to Pakistan and India relations. Issue of Kashmir had new meaning, once freedom fighters of Kashmir were now terrorist, Indians were labeling them as terrorist since long but they could convince world over this but now suddenly over night all the world powers were on there side, Indians were trying hard to get it approved from the world that kashmiri freedom fighters are terrorist and Pakistan is harboring them to promote terrorism inside India, they had some success in this case, kashmiri mujahidine were called as terrorist but USA and other powers had there interests in Pakistan, that’s why they can’t declare Pakistan as a terrorist state. So in these testing and difficult environment Pakistan’s natural choice was to side line with USA and other world powers in this war on terror. This decision of pakistan countered Indian proganda well and Pakistan won back confidence of world powers. With this confidence Pakistan successfully forced India to with draw its aggressive stance over bilateral issues. India and Pakistan were asked to resolve their issue through dialogues .this change saw some ground breaking developments but nothing meaningful is achieved, but thngs returned to normality between the two countries, both countries hope that with the passage of time the so-called "CBMs" (confidence building measures) between the two countries will become their own reward, and that perhaps with increased economic and commercial exchanges, cultural interplay, and trends toward moderation in Pakistan, Pakistanis will develop a different perception of India and Kashmir. India also hopes that other critical issues, such as energy, sharing of water resources, security, and good neighborly relations, may eventually take precedence over Kashmir in defining the countries' relationship, freeing India to find an internal solution to the dispute, facilitated by Pakistan's diminished leverage and unforced concessions. There might be gains for Pakistan in the relationship with India, but not in Kashmir, whose centrality to India-Pakistan relations will have gradually eroded. But still still big challenge for Pakistan to peruse its case of Kashmir in this changed world where difference between a terrorist and freedom fighters has vanished. Slightest of increase in the kashmiri freedom movement would automatically provide an opportunity for India to fight its case of state sponsored terrorism.
Western Borders : - War on terror has its impact and challenges for Pakistan on its western borders with Iran and Afghanistan. Iran, with its regional ambitions, emerging nuclear capability, strategic rivalry with Pakistan, and suspicions of a U.S.-Pakistan axis, has the motive and capability, if not the intention, to leverage Pakistan's policies. Iran is also a rival influence in Afghanistan and an economic competitor for access to Central Asia, which itself remains unstable. Furthermore, an unsettled Afghanistan, especially where the Taliban rump—which has affinities with and support from Pakistan's tribal areas—still remains, can be a source of potential instability on the Pakistan-Afghan border and an irritant in the relations between the two countries. But Iran can’t lose Pakistan’s support against USA aggression over its nuclear program. If tomorrow USA decides to attack Iran, Pakistan’s support for this adventure would be very necessary, so its very important for both USA and Iran that how Pakistan calculate this scenario.
Historically its always its eastern borders where Pakistan had all the worries and challenges to handle, it never had any military presence on its western borders with Afghanistan. Though Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan has not been all that smooth and pleasant, and worse came with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, even in such fragile times Pakistan never had any significant military presence on its border with Afghanistan. But at last Pakistan is forced to employee 80 thousands troops on its porous border with Afghanistan to handle and counter terrorism and Taliban movements across this border, this change seriously hurt its military strength on eastern borders with India. But the more serious Pakistan army was forced to fight against their own people and in an unknown area, natural advantage was with Taliban who had local support and were more familiar with the guerilla warfare and the mountainous terrain. Bu they learned from the early losses and improved their activity and had further success. But both American and Afghan government ( president Hamid Kerzai ) are continuously blaming Pakistan for across the border movement of Taliban which is one of the main reason for ever increasing unrest inside Afghanistan.. Now there is a very complex situation for Pakistan, which is full of challenges and security threats. Its commitments with USA for War on terror holds a binding on Pakistan to seal its border with Afghanistan , which is next to impossible , to stop this reported movement of Taliban. This isn’t a simple task it would take a lot of effort to make it possible. Second task which Pakistan has on its job list is to eliminate Taliban and Al-Qaida elements present inside its borders in FATA region. But elimination of these Taliban elements is full of risks and threats , any campaign against Taliban in FATA region and some settled districts of NWFP would put a lot things at stake, but this is important even for Pakistan’s internal and external security, because what ever unrest which is setting in Pakistan , Taliban are directly and indirectly responsible for this. If they are given free hand they would spoil everything and would make everything ugly and distorted. Pakistan should take this task seriously and should try to win support of local population to snatch that natural advantage from Taliban which they are having at the moment. With out local support Taliban would not find it easy to continue their activities. Recently started propaganda by the Afghan President , as he is looking to blame Pakistan for every ill that is happening inside Afghanistan, is building up pressure on Pakistan to act move strongly against these Taliban. USA and India are fully supportive of Afghan president, they are also involving ISI into this game, they say thay ISI is responsible for attacks on Afghan President and recent bombing out side Indian embassy in Afghanistan.

The regional security environment thus compels Pakistan to have some impression of leverage in dealing with both India and Afghanistan. But Pakistan shouldn’t leave these jihadi outfits unscathed and should also turned on the Taliban with full force. Even Pakistan need to calculate it whether or not these jihadists, have nay role in the future, if there is any role for them then they should be handled and sidelined accordingly but if the naswer is in negative then they should be eliminated through every mean, they should be compelled to give up their activites. Though possible confrontation with Taliban could be a dangerous provocation.. But for a peaceful resolution of this issue it is very important to that Kashmir dispute is solved and foreigh occupation in Afghanistan is finished ASAP. In afore mentioned scenario these outfits may become rebels without a cause and thus die their own deaths.
Pakistan should get rid of this proposition as soon as possible that it is safe heaven for Al-Qaida and Taliban, because if tomorrow something happen which is as serious and big as 9/11 incident and it is concluded that it was planned by some elements who are sitting in FATA region, then there would be big trouble for Pakistan, it would be highly difficult for Pakistan to main its sovereignty and territorial integrity. So we should act fast before the time runs out.
Internal Security issues

Disjointed Society :- The country has serious problems relating to social change, governance, and democratization. Society is going through a turmoil, there is a grow trend of extremism and religious intolerance. One can debate endlessly as to whether the army or politicians are to blame for Pakistan's problems. Seen from a historical perspective, both have failed. Each has done enough damage to fully account for Pakistan's troubled history. They have both been united in common pursuit of strengthening their class and institutional interests. Indeed, their identities fluctuate and often merge imperceptibly. The army relied on the politicians for its legitimacy, while, in turn, the politicians have relied on the army's support to keep themselves in power and shield themselves from accountability. Both have pandered to the Islamists, who have provided the ideological underpinnings of a security-denominated nationalism in Pakistan that has guaranteed the military's dominant political profile. As a result, by creating political space for the Islamists, the military has helped foster religious extremism in the country.
Lack Of Political Will :- Thus, in a broad context, religion, politics, social order, national security, and foreign policy have all been rolled into one in Pakistan and—suffused with illusions and emotions— have come to both reflect and affect Pakistan's national priorities. Any sense of pursuing genuine national aims and moving in a positive direction has yielded to passions and empty slogans. Politics has become covered with cant, hypocrisy, and fraud.
Pakistan's multiple problems are now seamlessly linked and need to be attacked simultaneously. Above all, Pakistan needs to change its external behavior to strengthen its internal order, rather than pursue external goals at the expense of its internal stability. But because of his lack of legitimacy, Musharraf was dependent on forces resistant to change. These include the mullahs, whose extremism, ironically, he is fighting against, and the traditionally pro-establishment politicians who, like Musharraf, themselves have legitimacy problems and are fighting shy of reforms for fear of the mullahs and of social change that may erode the feudal and social structure they represent. Further, the support of the army, Musharraf's main constituency, imposes its own cost. By offering the military civilian jobs and economic and commercial incentives, the army's stake in its domination of political power only grows further and comes at the expense of democracy. Musharraf had unlike allies with discordant agendas, none of whom could offer him unqualified support. While each of them supported him on one issue, but opposed him on another. Thus, with each reform that is made another must be sacrificed.
Criticism provoked by his alignment with the United States and suspicions that his reforms are at the behest of the United States have also weakened Past and present gevernment. Indeed, the strongest resistance to him comes from the Islamists, whose tolerance toward these pro American policies has already been stretched to the limit by his cooperation in the war on terrorism. government is some what afraid to test it any further, that’s why government is trying to expand its political base in order to comply with the U.S. war on terrorism and securing country’s existence.
There is an ever increasing hatred for America and those who look to defend pro American policies across the society, results of last two elections speak volumes about it. Political parties who campaigned against war on terror and American aggression enjoyed success, MMA’s success in NWFP in 2002 election and in 2008 elections both PPP and PML-n had view against all out co-operation with USA in this war on terror. Government needs seriously to work on this to induce understanding of all the policies that it adopts for its commitments in this war on terror.
Internal law and order situation is the country is in worse shape, this is also a gift of this war on terror for Pakistanis, there is every day some killings in the shape of bomb blasts, suicide attacks, firing etc. we see foreigners are reluctant to come to Pakistan, recent postponement of ICC’s cricket Champion Trophy, which was suppose to be help in Pakistan in the sep 2008. this varying law and order has seriously hampered country’s image abroad. General public are under serious stress and pressure as far as they are concerned for their personal safety. These fears and suspicions aggravated when they see that law enforcement agencies themselves are not safe, they are attacked every day and hey can’t protect themselves. How would they safe guard others.
This ever varying law and order situation has seriously damaged economy and country is experiencing effects of very high inflation, every day currency is losing its worth against dollar, stock exchange index is dropping every day and on the verge of a closure. There is shortage of electricity in the country because government doesn’t have enough money to pay bills to private power generation companies, who have cut down their power generations. Foreign reserves are shrinking consistently and during last 8 months, they have shrunk by 50%. All these things have other reasons as well but some how where they are very closely linked with the consistently varying law and order situation, to maintain stable law and order situation is a big problem for this government and its going to be a big test for them.
USA-PAK relationship
War on terror has induced new life into the PAK – USA relations, but there are many apprehension about the durability of these renewed relations between the two. This revival of relations has resulted in various complication for Pakistan, there are people who are questioning the logic and rationale behind this partnership. Up till now all negative aftermath has falling into Pakistan’s bucket while all the positive are for USA. One needs to add balance Why is it that Pakistan has rarely disappeared for any length of tie from the United States' strategic radar screen? For more than five decades, it has loomed large in one form or another, as either a staunch ally, a troublesome friend, or even a threat. Now, for the first time, it is all of these things.
The war on terrorism may have provided the rationale for the current U.S. reengagement with Pakistan, but this war neither limits the relationship's scope nor exhausts the challenges it faces. The reengagement has merged with Pakistan's own reform effort, America's evolving strategic relationship with South Asia, and the broader issue of democracy in the Muslim world. And in Pakistan and beyond, this new relationship collides with the crosscurrents of religious extremism.
In the light of current campaign of war on terror U.S. policy choices toward Pakistan are complex and imperfect. Though Pakistan is not a failed state nor a failing or a rogue state, it has had, to varying degrees, tendencies of all three. On top of that, it is a nuclear power. So how should the U.S. relate to Pakistan? Pakistan is now not only a challenge but also a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. How does the United States keep Pakistan on its side when it may also target Pakistan? And if Pakistan is to be an object of reforms, how does the United States help the country, especially its democratization process?
Critical U.S. policy choices toward Pakistan must also be integrated with broader regional policies. South Asia has changed and so has the basis of U.S. relations with it. The currents of change, spawned by the post–Cold War world and globalization and gestated by the war on terrorism, have been flowing in varying directions. This presents new threats and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy. For example, India offers the United States great economic and strategic opportunities, but it is Pakistan's internal dynamics and relationship with India that have been at the root of challenges to U.S. foreign policy in South Asia.
Historical Perspective
What has been unusual about the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is that their spells of close ties have been, and may continue to be, single-issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration, which enjoyed, at best, limited or qualified support among their respective public and strategic communities. During each engagement there has been either a military or military-dominated government in Pakistan, while in Washington, the policy direction on Pakistan has largely been in the hands of the White House, Pentagon, and the CIA.
The relationship has also shared problems typical of U.S. ties with a small country. Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional impulses, while the United States tends to consider global dynamics in its relationships. The United States has historically made light of Pakistan's security concerns and underestimated the strength of Pakistan's commitment to its nuclear program, and Pakistan has failed to see that an inflated U.S.- Pakistan engagement had no staying power. Pakistan particularly has not understood the enormous challenges of running U.S. foreign policy and the need of U.S. policymakers to weigh foreign policy concerns against domestic political considerations, the dynamics of the media, America's sense of exceptionalism and moral purpose, the country's historical experience, and cold-blooded power politics. All this made it neither compelling nor easy for the United States to harmonize its strategic and tactical goals, short- and long-term agenda, and global and regional interests.
As a consequence, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, for much of its history, has lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared vision beyond the narrowly based and vaguely defined. It is no wonder, then, that as soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan in past engagements, U.S.-Pakistan policy consensus would break down. Pakistan was either consigned to benign neglect or hit with a succession of punitive sanctions that left in their trail resentment and a sense of betrayal. In a strange irony, this led the engagements between the two countries to alternate with periods of estrangements. Consequently, the United States did not have the influence or leverage to address issues of concern, including those born of its own close cooperation with Pakistan. Such highs and lows turned into a love-hate relationship between the two.
Yet, U.S.-Pakistan cooperation has served some important mutual interests in the past and is doing so again in the present. As with previous periods of engagement, the current relationship may yet leave in its wake serious problems that may have to be addressed in the future at a much higher cost. Historically, the issues marking the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, whether they united or divided the two countries, have had a critical bearing on their respective national goals and priorities.
The first of the three major U.S. engagements with Pakistan occurred during the height of the Cold War, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s; the second was during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, again lasting about a decade; and the third engagement dates to September 11, 2001, and relates to the war on terrorism.

Anti-Americanism
Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has a complex dynamic. It is framed by four concentric circles: general reaction to U.S. might and power, America's current international conduct, relations between Islam and the West, and the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Indeed, as the most powerful nation on earth, the United States provokes envy and resentment around the world. As for America's international conduct, its legitimacy and self-centeredness have been under challenge, especially after September 11. Regarding Islam and the West, the picture is even more complex.
September 11 did not change history so much as it signaled the arrival in history of new struggles and conflicts and a dissolution of traditional patterns of power relationships. Well before, the relations between big powers were becoming at once cooperative, tense, and competitive: globalization was inciting serious discontent, the Islamic world was looking disordered, and regional disputes were beginning to radiate much violence and instability. There was a new wave of predominantly religion-based revisionism against the vestiges of the colonial and imperialist era and the domestic and international orders, which appealed to moderates and radicals alike in the Muslim world.
Pakistan and the rest of the Islamic world are in ferment. Islamic societies that have invariably experienced colonialism or varied forms of Western domination have been experiencing conflict in their search for national identities, political stability, and effective ways of absorbing modern liberal values. They have also been coming to terms with anti-Western feelings that have interloped into their culture. Across the Islamic world, the West, especially the United States, is believed to have historically complicated this search by becoming a party to this conflict. There is also a class antipathy to the ethically intolerable value system of the ruling classes, which themselves are invariably Western oriented.
The war on terrorism has sharpened the tensions between Islam and the West. The United States seems to be fighting terrorism with traditional instruments of power, whose bluntness obscures the subtlety and complexity of the issues involved, and with a crusading zeal that speaks of an ideological struggle and clash of civilizations. Elements on both sides see their basic value system as under siege and have exaggerated their mutual fears and are busy defaming and demonizing each other. Moral issues have been undifferentiated or confused, or sacrificed to self-righteousness. Each side is judging the other with its own ideals, ideals from which it has fallen short itself. The Islamic world especially rationalizes its own errant behavior by accusing the West of double standards. No wonder, in Pakistan, liberals and conservatives alike are outraged by the mistreatment of their "national hero" AQ Khan.
Within this larger framework, the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations has generated its own anti-Americanism, which is triggered by a perception that the United States has not been a reliable ally and has not helped Pakistan much in its conflict with India. September 11 and U.S. reengagement added new issues to the debate. For instance, liberal aspirations for democracy have been heightened but tend to flow into anti-American channels because of government’s association with the United States. These aspirations both merge with and deviate from the religious wave, as democracy and religion use the same jargon of social protest but advocate different means of empowerment. Nationalism, too, has come to the fore and is expressed, on one level, through anti-Americanism provoked by the war on terrorism and, on another, through the assertion of the will of smaller provinces.
Liberals in the Islamic world have their own reasons to be disaffected with the United States, particularly those aspects of the war on terrorism that are seen as repressive. There is a sense that the United States has fallen short of its ideals and its foreign policy has abandoned soft power, losing its moral superiority. Most liberals also feel that the United States is closing its doors on them with some of the more heavy-handed visa policies of the Department of Homeland Security. Besides, the United States has provoked anger all around by denigrating Muslim societies as backward and failed and by patronizing them with offers to help them modernize.
Anti-Americanism has one additional dimension in Pakistan. For decades, governments in Pakistan that often lacked popular support acquiesced to public resentment of America, using the United States as a lightning rod to divert dangerous currents of socioeconomic discontent within Pakistan. Now this same anti-Americanism is being exploited by the Islamists to gain popular support.
Nonetheless, there is also a muted appreciation of what America has done for Pakistan, especially in the nation's early history, when it was struggling for survival. And all the main political parties, including the Islamists, have channels of communication open with the United States and are prepared to work with it.



Pakistan’s way forward

Reformation of Society:- Government would have to take some very bold decisions to promote democracy and liberalism. Militancy and hardcore approach should be discouraged at any cost. Pakistan is facing many challenges including economic development and Islamic extremism., hour of need is to call very boldly for modern, liberal Islamic ideals. As world expects Pakistan to be nationally cohesive, at peace with itself and its neighbors, and a responsible member of the international community. To meet these strategic objectives, Pakistan must develop policies that contest regressive socioeconomic structures; promote education; encourage moderation, tolerance, and accommodation; seek an end to poverty and corruption; and address ethnolinguistic, religious, and sectarian prejudices. Above all, peace with India and a strategic reorientation in the army's core beliefs are critical to Pakistan's economic survival and national security. Stakes are high. Failure to reform will only give strength to the Islamists and their competing vision for the future of Pakistan.
Political Enlighment :- Government should realize that enlightened moderation is more than cultural liberalization. Only political liberalization will help strengthen liberal and secular forces that can be his allies in defeating religious extremism. Otherwise, cultural openness could backfire and give further ammunition to the fundamentalists, provoking a cultural war that could get entangled with class conflicts. Government should also bear in mind that economic development is neither a substitute for democracy nor a guarantee of his own survival or of Pakistan's political stability. One need only look to what happened in Iran—where despite economic gains people rose up against the Shah—as evidence of this.
Its rhetoric may be revolutionary, but Pakistan's political system is quasi reactionary— that is, it is the same civil-military bureaucratic complex that continues to work under the cover of a flawed democracy dominated by feudal tribal interests. Even working at its most efficient, the system will only be able to change Pakistan modestly before it itself becomes a roadblock to change. Thanks to the economic policies and management of Prime Minister Aziz, Pakistan has registered an impressive growth rate, but prospects of a major economic transformation remain uncertain.
Need For Good Governance :- Pakistan's economic development will remain limited if the country does not come to terms with problems of poor public services, corruption, inequities in land and income distribution, social exclusion of the marginalized and vulnerable, particularly women, and high illiteracy rates. Pakistan needs a new organizing idea and an improved relationship between its provinces and center. For example, the province of Baluchistan is significant for Pakistan's future economic prospects. It is rich in mineral resources that are strategically located near vital sea lanes and two oil-bearing regions, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. But the development of Baluchistan is resisted by tribal chiefs who fear their traditional authority will be undermined there. (Similarly, the sharing and harnessing of water resources for irrigation and hydroelectric power are also contentious issues between the central government and the provinces.) The problem is political, not economic. Only through better management of relations between the central and provincial governments—which may even require constitutional adjustments—can Pakistan realize its full economic potential.
Political stability :- Political stability and peaceful internal order are essential for attracting critically needed foreign investment for economic development. The ability to provide such security depends upon the integrity and effectiveness of Pakistan's political process. In other words, economic development and democracy are interdependent. Economic change will foster a middle class that may help lead the balance of economic and political power away from the feudal stranglehold.
Military’s Role :- Beyond 2007, the army should have only a watch-dog role in the government. This should be for a designated period of time, provided there is a national consensus and constitutional support for the idea. Pakistan will not become a perfect democracy overnight, but such a move may be necessary to carry the reforms further; otherwise, the country will become depoliticized and may accelerate toward extremism and internal disorder.
If there is a broad spectrum of political and economic change empowering a new civilian leadership, the military will have no rationale to dominate Pakistan's political life. This may be the only way to resolve the complexity of having to deal with two imperfect choices—immediate democratization in a social context that hosts forces resistant to reforms, and open-ended reliance on army rule that is committed to reforms but is resistant to democracy.
PAK – USA Partnership :- Pakistan has to make the best possible use of the current U.S. engagement but also keep in mind two facts. First, Pakistan has to change and reform on its own. (Thus far, the United States' principal interest has only been in stabilizing Pakistan.) Second, while in the past Pakistan criticized the United States for lack of commitment to the relationship, Pakistan itself showed little regard for Washington by pursuing policies that defied U.S. concerns, such as those related to terrorism and the export of nuclear technology. Pursuing these policies served no conceivable national interest of Pakistan.
On proliferation, Pakistan needs to come clean about the past and assure the United States about the future. It is best to discuss the past now while the relationship is strong enough to absorb any further shocking disclosures.
Pakistan also has to recognize that opposition to some of America's core concerns, especially as it relates to nuclear proliferation, democracy, and peace with India, may be tolerated by Washington in the near term for the sake of expediency, but that such opposition will have no lasting place in a long-term relationship with the United States.


India and Pakistan Relations and USA’s Role
Critical U.S. policy choices in the region require an integrated approach to the issues of concern as they are all inextricably linked. Militancy and extremism, for instance, are linked as much to Pakistan's sense of insecurity as to the army's ambitions. Some of the core U.S. foreign policy concerns are thus rooted in India-Pakistan tensions. U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, therefore, should be designed to advance the prospects of regional peace and stability. Preoccupied by Iraq and relieved by the apparent success of the India-Pakistan dialogue, the United States may be tempted by a laissez-faire approach to the peace process. But the fact is, favorable and reciprocal changes in multiple contexts—domestic, bilateral, and international—are requisite to the resolution of long-standing conflicts. In that sense, enhanced U.S. stakes in South Asia are a stimulus to the peace process. However, this strategic pressure point will be eroded by any U.S. indifference to the India-Pakistan dialogue. Indeed, if the peace process fails, the United States will be blamed by the people of Pakistan on one hand for seemingly "pressuring" Pakistan to normalize relations with India and on the other for weakening Pakistan's leverage in Kashmir with the war on terrorism. The United States must therefore be engaged in the peace process to insure against its failure, as dissatisfaction among Pakistanis from an adverse outcome will ignite agitation against Government.
Additionally, a successful normalization of relations between Pakistan and India benefits the United States in more ways than one. It could, for instance, ease Pakistan's security fears and help lower the army's political profile, opening the way for democratization, and advance the prospects of an integrated South Asia market linked to energy-rich Central Asia, increasing opportunities for U.S. investment there.
Peace between India and Pakistan will also ease fears of a nuclear war, may open up the possibility of their incorporation into the international nuclear community, and will help strengthen their command and control structure, which will encourage nonproliferation. Though the United States will not let India and Pakistan be accepted into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime as nuclear powers, the United States is keen to sign on both Pakistan and India to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Bush administration's latest strategy to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But Pakistan is not likely to join the PSI without India's participation. To get Pakistan and India on board, China's help should also be solicited. As a nuclear power with complex relations with both South Asian states, China can be an important contributor to strategic stabilization in South Asia.
Institution Building and Democracy
Pakistan's problems are not lack of institutions but the trivialization of the institutions. If institutions are not working, especially the police, judiciary, and administrative services, it is because they have been undermined by their subservience to the dominant centers of power. They can only be reformed if social and political structures are first reformed. Education and social sectors, however, are in a dysfunctional state and in need of urgent help. Building up of these depilated institutions is in the interest of Pakistan and war on terrorism.
As for democracy, with present winds of changes blowing in Pakistan, Government should look to promote these democratic norms further, for the first time in the history of Pakistan a strong political power base is made to leave his office with out much of unrest and chaos, now its up to the political leaders in power to continue these good traditions, attitude of tolerance and peaceful co-existence should be promoted.
Educational Reforms
Pakistan needs educational reforms more than anything else. US AID considers educational reform to be the most important current development project in Pakistan. In July 2002, more than $100 million was dedicated to a five-year education reform plan. USAID and Pakistan's Ministry of Education are working together to improve (1) policy and planning, (2) teacher and administrator training, (3) adult and youth literacy programs, and (4) partnership development and community building between the public and private spheres. Government should also invest in projects dedicated to improving teacher training and developing teaching materials; to building and furnishing schools in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; These extensive efforts will only succeed if they are implemented countrywide and emphasize local solutions for meeting educational goals rather than impose unworkable or culturally insensitive solutions from the outside. Besides, the current levels of U.S. aid allocation for educational reforms do not appear to be adequate to the task and may have to be doubled, at least.
Given the problems already identified with Pakistan's bureaucracy, the United States has an understandable distrust of the government machinery for channeling U.S. aid to education reforms. The United States has turned to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as an alternative mechanism for implementing change in the education sector. An uncritical trust of NGOs is also a risk, however—many are themselves a product of an elitist and self-serving system. Pakistan should be encouraged to emulate the example of Bangladesh, where grass-roots-based NGOs have a stronger sense of public service. Indeed, the United States should help Pakistan build civil society, the most important institution-building challenge in the country after education.
According to Pakistan's minister of education, the government has vastly enhanced his ministry's budget to carry out wide-ranging reforms in the education system, including increasing teacher salaries, opening new schools, especially in villages, and modernizing the curriculum. The government has given him a budget allocation of 5.5 billion rupees to reform madrassahs by introducing science subjects and the teaching of English to their curricula, provide computers for classroom use, and upgrade their physical infrastructure. To date, madrassahs have been hesitant to accept such government intervention for reform.
However, there is a high risk that such policies will end up strengthening the madrassahs without actually reforming them. Their funding is already drying up, and reform will only give them a shot in the arm. Over the long run, with an expanded and reformed public educational system, the madrassahs will wither on the vine. Instead of bailing them out, they should be gradually absorbed into the mainstream educational system.


Political Islam
This partnership between USA and Pakistan for this war on terror must show some immediate results to demonstrate that there is an alternative vision for Pakistan and that it is working. The engagement must not fail because the alternative, an extremist Pakistan that itself becomes a U.S. target, will be a policy nightmare.
To be successful, the engagement must be geared toward benefiting the people, not just the regime. This will raise the people's confidence in the country's relationship with the United States. Additionally, the United States must not appear to be in conflict with Islam. Political Islam is not something out there on the fringes that the United States can combat and conquer. To varying degrees, it has been ingrained in the social culture of the Muslim world because of the emotional appeal of the causes it espouses. To this end, leaders of Muslim countries may have to make some compromises with the religion. The United States has to respect not only these concessions but also some minimum nationalist and democratic aspirations in the Islamic world. That is the possible remedy if USA is interested in some what acceptability of war on terror in the Islamic world.
Economic and Security Assistance and Sanctions Policy
The United States needs to find a new paradigm for its relationship with Pakistan. The weak sanctions of the 1990s that offered Pakistan no incentive for change did not work. In the future, sanctions should not be a policy option as long as there are strong reasons for the United States to be engaged with Pakistan and to help its reform efforts. Reform should be an end in itself, as a reformed Pakistan is in the interest of the United States whether or not there is a quid pro quo. Additionally, the United States needs to build a broader coalition of countries to support Pakistan's reform efforts, including highly visible donors such as Japan.
The United States must also help Pakistan create a dynamic economy that generates employment. To this end, the bilateral investment agreement between the two countries should be expedited. It will be seen by the international business community as an affirmation of Pakistan's economic stability, and thus raise investor confidence in the country. Indeed, U.S. and Japanese companies should be offered special incentives to invest in Pakistan. Pakistan considers the free-trade agreement with the United States an essential component of its economic development program. In the meantime, both the United States and Japan should provide greater market access for Pakistani textiles as an effective interim measure for relief.
The U.S. aid program toward Pakistan should focus heavily on supporting poverty reduction strategies. There is already a perception among Pakistanis of increased poverty in the country, concerns about rising inflation, and discontent over the army's growing domination of the civilian institutions, not to mention a host of other internal tensions in the country. In the absence of a charismatic secular leader, the entire range of opposition could coalesce under an Islamic banner, such as happened in the Iranian revolution. The U.S. would be well-advised to avoid such a scenario.
A minimum level of security assistance should also be immune from any future sanctions or political pressure by the United States. Pakistan has genuine defense and foreign policy concerns. Even if the country has overplayed these threats, they are real. Nor should Pakistan be any less deserving of the international community's sympathy and understanding just because of its past errant behavior. A reformed Pakistan, headed toward moderation, strongly committed against militancy, and at peace with India, is unlikely to go against America's core interests. Indeed, a strong Pakistan may be helpful in moderating India's ambitions.
The ability of the United States to help reform Pakistan will be strengthened if the United States appears to be less in need of Pakistan than Pakistan is in need of the United States. U.S. interests go well beyond the war against terrorism. By expending all of its political capital in securing Pakistan's cooperation in that war, the United States risks diminishing its leverage with Pakistan and neglecting other important strategic goals, such as promoting democracy in Pakistan and the Muslim world and containing nuclear proliferation. Any increase in the existing levels of security assistance, or any further sale of major defense equipment beyond the F-16s, should be linked to Pakistan's cooperation on these issues, as well as on the war on terrorism. What is needed is a broader framework for its relationship with Pakistan, one in which the war against terrorism is at the center of the agenda but does not crowd out other interests.
Conclusion

The current U.S. engagement with Pakistan may be focused on the war on terrorism, but it is not confined to it. It also addresses several other issues of concern to the United States: national and global security, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, economic and strategic opportunities in South Asia, democracy, and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.
The current U.S. engagement with Pakistan offers certain lessons for U.S. policymakers. These are related to the risks involved in basing policy on principles without having a strategy, isolating a country that has the capacity to harm, and nation-building in a country ambivalent or resistant to the United States' embrace.
The United States must help Pakistan pursue a path that meets its people's democratic aspirations and socioeconomic needs and is resilient enough to accommodate ethnolinguistic, regional, religious, and sectarian differences. Only such a course can help Pakistan become a stable and responsible member of the international community, at peace with itself and with its neighbors.
Sanctions toward Pakistan should not be a policy option. However, the United States should put some pressure on Pakistan to keep the country's reform effort on track and to induce it to act as a responsible nuclear power. For this purpose, the United States should not allow Pakistan to feel that the United States needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the United States.
An assured and secure Pakistan is more likely to define its future in economic terms, wage peace with India, and be a natural ally of the United States. Therefore, Pakistan's peace process with India must be supported by the United States. The benefits to Pakistan must counterbalance the effects of a renunciation of Kashmir and the attendant loss of national honor this will cause.
Anti-Americanism exists in Pakistan but it can be toned down if the United States reaches out to liberal forces, the business community, and the female population. The United States should also reach out to the younger generation in Pakistan, which may resent U.S. power but not its ideals. Indeed, youth in Pakistan support a U.S.- backed normalization of relations with India, the fight against religious extremism, and educational and institutional reforms.
U.S.-Pakistan relations will stand or fall based on whether they benefit the Pakistani nation. And in their success or failure lies the future of Islamic extremism in the country.